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NOTE
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF HOMOSEXUALS:
IMPLICATIONS OF LAWRENCE v. TEXAS
"I Do Not Like Thee, Dr. Fell; the Reason Why I Cannot Tell. -1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are in the "privacy" of your own home and you and
another person are engaged in the most intimate physical act with one an-
other-sex. Now imagine that it just happens to be either oral sex or anal
sex. Before you know what is happening, the police barge into your home.
When they see what the two of you are doing, you are arrested. Next, the of-
ficers drive you to the police station where you are fingerprinted and
booked. The two of you are forced to spend the rest of the night in jail and
are not released until the next day.
You wonder why the police entered your home in the first place. What
was it that you did wrong? Later you find out that your neighbor does not
approve of you or your behavior. So, she called the police, falsely claiming
that someone at your house was causing trouble and was armed with a
weapon. Also, imagine that, because you took part in this consensual, inti-
mate conduct, you are convicted of the "crime" of engaging in "deviate sex-
ual intercourse" and are subsequently fined. As a result, four states consider
you a sex offender and you are obligated to register as such with law en-
forcement.2 Consequently, this conviction forbids you from becoming a doc-
tor, an athletic trainer, a bus driver, or one of several other professions.'
You may think that this whole scenario seems absurd or ridiculous, but
this story is John Geddes Lawrence's and Tyron Garner's reality. On the
night of September 17, 1998, police officers entered Lawrence's home and
intruded upon Lawrence and Garner having sex.4 The men were jailed and
were not released until the following day.5 They were convicted of violating
a statute that makes it a crime in Texas to engage in deviate sexual inter-
1. E.J. Graff, Scalia on Gay Rights; Breyer on 17th-Century Poetry; and More on Oral
Arguments in the Texas Sodomy Case, The American Prospect, at
http://www.sodomylaws.orglawrence/lwnews037.htm (Mar. 27, 2003) (quoting Justice
Breyer during Oral Arguments, in which Breyer quoted a seventeenth century poem by an
Oxford student about his dislike of a particular dean).
2. Petitioners' Brief at 27, Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(No. 02-102), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (Dec. 2, 2002).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id.
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course with a member of the same sex. Several lengthy appeals followed, re-
sulting in an appearance before the United States Supreme Court and culmi-
nating in a landmark decision having a significant impact on gay rights. This
Note analyzes the Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas6 and ad-
dresses the implications the case will have on other legal issues concerning
homosexuals.
After the Introduction in Part I, Part II examines relevant case law re-
garding this case, including Bowers v. Hardwick,' Romer v. Evans,' and City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.9 Part III will discuss the Lawrence v.
Texas opinions from both the Texas Appeals Court and the United States
Supreme Court. Part IV scrutinizes O'Connor's concurrence regarding the
Equal Protection argument, taking a closer look at the analysis she applied
and the effect this will have on future opinions. Part V explores the impact
the Lawrence decision has on other areas concerning gay rights. Part VI
concludes the analysis.
II. RELEVANT CASES LEADING TO LAWRENCE
A. Bowers v. Hardwick
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the United States Supreme Court held that there
is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 0 The defendant,
Hardwick, was charged with violating Georgia's anti-sodomy statute after
engaging in sodomy with another adult male in his home.1" Although the
statute applied equally to homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, the court
only evaluated the statute as it applied to homosexual sodomy.' 2
The defendants used Griswold v. Connecticut,3 and other decisions rec-
ognizing "reproductive rights," to argue that the Ninth Amendment creates a
zone of privacy regarding consensual sexual activity, including homosexual
sodomy. 14 However, all of these cases involved marriage, family, and pro-
creation, and the Supreme Court majority found that these cases did not bear
"any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to en-
gage in acts of sodomy."'" The Court said, "[T]he proposition that any kind
of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insu-
lated from state proscription is unsupportable."16 The United States Supreme
Court also reasoned that a state may regulate morality through its police
6. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
9. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
10. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
11. Id. at 187-88.
12. Id at 190.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
15. ld. at 190-91.
16. Id. at 191.
[Vol. 40
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power.' 7 However, the Court did not say whether there was a rational foun-
dation for the moral belief.8
The Supreme Court has outlined a test to determine "the rights qualify-
ing for heightened judicial protection."' 9 A fundamental right is one that is
"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor
justice would exist if it were sacrificed."'" Fundamental liberties are also
"characterized as those liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition."' 2 ' In Bowers, the Court did not explain why sodomy did
not fit into these two definitions other than to say: "[I]t is obvious to us that
neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homo-
sexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy."'22 The Court then recounted
the history of sodomy laws and concluded that it was not "inclined to take a
more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights
imbedded in the Due Process Clause."23
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the narrow question pre-
sented, indicating that the "case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let
alone.'"24 Blackmun also felt that Hardwick may have had Eighth Amend-
ment or Equal Protection Clause claims, and that Georgia's anti-sodomy
statute "interferes with constitutionally protected interests in privacy and
freedom of intimate association."'25 The State asserted that individuals who
engage in the conduct prohibited by Georgia's statute interfere with the
"right... to maintain a decent society."26 Justice Blackmun noted, however,
that "[n]o matter how uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority
of this Court, we have held that '[mere] public intolerance or animosity can-
not constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty."27
17. Id. at 196.
18. Christopher Wolfe, Forum on Public Morality: Public Morality and the Modem Su-
preme Court, 45 AM. J. JuRIs. 65, 76-77 (2000) ("Demonstrating a rational basis for a public
morality statute is particularly important, in light of one argument against such statutes: that
they violate separation of Church and State, since they constitute an imposition of sectarian
doctrine.").
19. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
20. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
21. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
22. Id. But cf. Graff, supra note 1 ("This Court has insisted that 'liberty' means you get
to decide what to do with your body, your home and your family-that if the Constitution
stands for anything, it stands for protecting your private life from the state (unless the state
has a pretty darn good reason to interfere).").
23. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94.
24. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1982) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
25. Id. at 202.
26. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 59-60 (1973)).
27. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
575 (1975)).
2003]
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B. Romer v. Evans
In Romer v. Evans,28 the United States Supreme Court held that a Colo-
rado constitutional amendment, Amendment 2, prohibiting official protec-
tion from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.29 Using a rational basis
standard of review, the most deferential test, the Court invalidated Amend-
ment 2, which first, contained a classification of "homosexuals," and second,
withdrew "from homosexuals, but no others,... legal protection from...
discrimination, and [prohibited] reinstatement of these laws and policies."30
The State's primary rationale for the Amendment was "respect for other citi-
zens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or
employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality."31
The Court noted that homosexuals as a class were singled out by
Amendment 2 and were accorded less protection under the law because of
their membership in the class.32 Although the Court utilized a rational basis
standard for its analysis, Amendment 2 still failed this most deferential stan-
dard because the Court found the amendment advanced no legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.33 The Court realized that the Amendment made homo-
sexuals unequal to all other people and did not further a proper legislative
end.34
C. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,35 the Supreme Court
struck down a city zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for a
home for the mentally retarded, but exempting other uses from this permit
requirement, such as apartment houses, fraternity houses, apartment hotels,
hospitals, private clubs and other specified uses. 36 The Equal Protection is-
sue presented was: "May the city require [a] permit for this facility when
other care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely permitted?"37 The Su-
preme Court agreed with the lower courts that "'[if] the potential residents of
the... home were not mentally retarded, but the home was the same in all
other respects,"' its use would be authorized under the zoning ordinance.38
The city presented several bases on which to support the ordinance,
such as the fear and negative attitudes of residents living near the facility, lo-
28. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
29. Id. at 623.
30. Id at 627.
31. Id. at 635.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. ld.
35. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
36. Id. at 447-48.
37. Id. at 448.
38. Id. at 449-50 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 40
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cation of the home in a flood plain, the size of the home, and the number of
people who would occupy it.39 The Court demonstrated that each of these
factors did not apply because of how the city treated other groups similarly
situated.' The Supreme Court concluded that the City's requirement of a
permit was based on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.41
The Court was willing to look closer at whether the ordinance was rea-
sonably related to the State's goals. Usually economic and commercial legis-
lation "will be upheld if rationally related to any conceivable, legitimate
governmental purpose," and as long as there is a legitimate governmental
purpose, the court will presume that the ordinance is valid.42 Although the
Court would have been expected to uphold the ordinance using such an
analysis, it has been argued that the Court struck down the ordinance by ap-
plying a "less forgiving rational basis standard."43 Under this type of scru-
tiny, instead of giving deference, "the Court ... more closely examine[s] the
statute at issue to ensure that it bears a reasonable relation to the asserted
state goals."
III. THE CASE-LA WRENCE v. TEXAS
A. Texas Court of Appeals Opinion
1. The Majority
John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner were convicted of engaging
in homosexual conduct and were each fined two hundred dollars.45 On ap-
peal, they challenged the constitutionality of the law under which they were
convicted.' Section 21.06 of the Texas Penal Code makes it a misdemeanor
in Texas for a person to engage "in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex."'47 Texas defines "deviate sexual intercourse" as
"any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or
anus of another person; or... the penetration of the genitals or the anus of
another person with an object." a Lawrence and Garner contended that this
section of the Texas Penal Code violated their right to Equal Protection and
39. Id. at 448-49.
40. Id. at 449-50.
41. Id. at450.
42. Mark Strasser, Equal Protection at the Crossroads: On Baker, Common Benefits,
and Facial Neutrality, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 935, 939-40 (2000).
43. Id. at 940; see also Steven J. Eagle, Symposium: When Does Retroactivity Cross the
Line?: Winstar, Eastern Enterprises and Beyond: Substantive Due Process and Regulatory
Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REv. 977, 1026 (2000) (the Court's review has been la-
beled as "covertly heightened scrutiny") (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 769, 1612 (2d ed. 1988)).
44. Strasser, supra note 42, at 940-41.
45. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 350.
46. Id.
47. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1994); see also Graff, supra note 1 (the
Texas law is actually named the "Homosexual Conduct" law).
48. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01 (Vernon 1994).
2003]
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their right to privacy guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. 49
Police were investigating a reported "weapons disturbance," which
turned out to be false, 0 when they entered Lawrence's home and observed
Lawrence and Garner engaged in a sexual act. 5' Because appellants did not
challenge at trial or on appeal the conduct of the police leading to appellants'
discovery and arrest, the issue presented to the court was simply "whether
Section 21.06 is facially unconstitutional. 52
First, the Texas appeals court indicated that neither the United States
Supreme Court, nor any Texas court, has identified sexual orientation as a
suspect or protected class and therefore the statute is constitutional as long as
it is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 53 The statute's prohibi-
tion of sodomy was held to further the state's interest in preserving public
morals.5 4
The court then rejected appellants' argument that Section 21.06 uncon-
stitutionally discriminated on the basis of gender. 5  Lawrence and Garner
contended that the statute discriminated on the basis of sex because "the
physical act is not unlawful as between a man and woman, [but] it is unlaw-
ful when performed between two men or two women. 56 However, Texas
claimed the statute did not discriminate on the basis of gender because it
"applies equally to men and women, i.e., two men engaged in homosexual
conduct face the same sanctions as two women."57 Appellants then pointed
out that a "similar rationale was expressly rejected in the context of racial
discrimination."5 However, the Texas court was not willing to equate the
miscegenation statute with criminalizing homosexual conduct because there
is "nothing in the history of Section 21.06 to suggest it was intended to pro-
mote any hostility between the sexes, preserve any unequal treatment as be-
tween men and women, or perpetuate any societal or cultural bias with re-
gard to gender." 59
The statute did not give one gender an advantage over the other, nor
burden one gender more than the other.6° Although there was disproportion-
ate impact between heterosexuals and homosexuals, there was not dispropor-
49. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 350.
50. Petitioners' Brief at 2, Lawrence (No. 02-102) (stating that the person who called in
the report later admitted his allegations were false and he was convicted of filing a false re-
port).
51. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 350.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 353-54.
54. Id. at 357.
55. Id. at 357-58.
56. Id. at 357.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (holding a miscegenation statute
unconstitutional, despite the argument that the statute did not discriminate on the basis of race
because it applied equally to whites and blacks)).
59. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 357-58.
60. ld. at 359.
[Vol. 40
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tionate impact between men and women.6 Therefore, the court concluded,
the state statute was only subject to rational basis review and is still sup-
ported by a legitimate state interest.62 Section 21.06 did not violate the right
to privacy because "there is no constitutional 'zone of privacy' shielding
homosexual conduct from state interference. 6 3 The court indicated that al-
though there is no explicit guarantee of privacy in state or federal constitu-
tions, "both constitutions contain express limitations on governmental power
from which 'zones of privacy' may be inferred.""
"[Hiomosexual conduct is not a right that is 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' or 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'
' 65
The court reasoned "that the legislature, in the exercise of its police power,
has authority to criminalize the commission of acts which, without regard to
the infliction of any other injury, are considered immoral."'
2. The Dissent
Justice Anderson, in his dissent, disagreed with the "majority's Hercu-
lean effort to justify the discriminatory classification of section 21.06 of the
Penal Code despite the clear prohibitions on such discrimination contained
in the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the
Texas Equal Rights Amendment in the Bill of Rights of the Texas Constitu-
tion. '67 The dissent maintained that:
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the statute must fail because even ap-
plying the most deferential standard, the rational basis standard, the statute
cannot be justified on the majority's sole asserted basis of preserving pub-
lic morality, where the same conduct, defined as "deviate sexual inter-
course" is criminalized for same sex participants but not for heterosexu-
als.6
8
The dissent also argued that the statute should be analyzed under the
heightened intermediate scrutiny standard of review because it is not gender
neutral. 69 The dissent reasoned that there is no persuasive justification for the
classification and no showing that the statute is narrowly tailored to support
a government interest.70 Similarly, section 21.06 cannot withstand height-
61. Id.
62. Id.; see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L.
REv. 297, 303 (1997) ("[T]he Court applies intermediate scrutiny to those classifications it
considers 'semi-suspect'-such as those based on gender or illegitimacy.").
63. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 362.
64. Id. at 359.
65. Id. at 361.
66. Id. at 362.
67. ld. at 366.
68. Id. at 367.
69. Id. at 368.
70. Id.
20031
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ened scrutiny under the Texas Constitution because section 21.06 discrimi-
nates on the basis of gender, thus violating Texas's Equal Rights Amend-
ment, and statutes that contravene anything in the Texas Bill of Rights are
per se void under Texas state law.7" The dissent cited In re McLean,72 to
show that the State has the burden to support the statute and the State has
failed to make the required showing to defeat a challenge."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on this case;74 oral
arguments were presented on March 26, 2003.
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Majority
In a majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court in
Lawrence v. Texas reversed the Texas Court of Appeals decision.75 The
Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick and held that the Texas statute crimi-
nalizing intimate sexual conduct for persons of the same sex violated the
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.76
First, the Court reconsidered the holding in Bowers, relying on earlier
cases including Griswold v. Connecticut,77 Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 Roe v.
Wade79 and Carey v. Population Services, Int'ls° for the proposition that the
right to privacy in the bedroom is not restricted to married persons.8 Next,
the Court indicated that the issue in Bowers was incorrectly framed, and
stated that asking whether there is a fundamental right to homosexual sod-
omy is as demeaning as asking whether marriage is about the right to engage
in sexual intercourse. 2 Liberty instead includes the right of individuals to
enter into relationships in their own homes and private lives, where intimate
conduct is only one aspect of these relationships. 3
The Court then investigated the Bowers Court's claim that prohibitions
on sodomy had "ancient roots.,," Although there were early laws criminaliz-
ing sodomy, there was no indication that these laws were directed at homo-
sexuals and were not "enforced against consenting adults acting in pri-
71. Id.
72. 725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1987).
73. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 367.
74. Lawrence v. Texas, 537 U.S. 1044 (Dec. 2, 2002) (No. 02-102).
75. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
76. Id. at 2484.
77. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
78. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
79. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
81. Id. at 2477.
82. Id. at 2478.
83. id.
84. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)).
[Vol. 40
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vate."a Though the Bowers Court overstated the historical foundations, the
Court here acknowledged the point made by the Bowers Court that, for cen-
turies, homosexual conduct was viewed as immoral.86 However, the Court
noted that its "obligation is to define the liberty of all, not mandate [its] own
moral code." 87
The majority continued to invalidate the rationale of Bowers, in which
the Bowers Court made "sweeping references" to the history of Western
civilization and Judeo-Christian views of morality.88 However, the Lawrence
Court focused on other authorities regarding laws on homosexual conduct,
including British Parliament recommendations, reports, and laws, and the
European Convention of Human Rights, which all held views contrary to
Bowers.89 The decisions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey and Romer v. Evans also cut against the holding in Bowers.
90
Casey reinforced the constitutional protection given to personal decisions
regarding "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education." 9 Romer held that "class-based legislation directed
at homosexuals [is] a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."92
Next, the Court emphasized the "stigma" that homosexuals are sub-
jected to as a result of the Texas statute. 93 Although the charge is a class C
misdemeanor, it is still part of an individual's criminal record.94 Those con-
victed must register as sex offenders in at least four states, and the convic-
tion must be documented on job applications. 95 Relying on these reasons,
and taken together with the substantial amount of criticism Bowers has re-
ceived in the United States and by the European Court of Human Rights, the
Court found compelling reasons to overturn Bowers.
%
Justice Kennedy summed up the majority opinion by stressing several
points made by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Bowers. Prohibiting certain
acts cannot be justified simply because a state has traditionally viewed the
practice as immoral. 97 Decisions concerning physical relationships, "even
when not intended to produce offspring... extends to intimate choices by
unmarried as well as married persons. ' 98 Finally, the Court stressed that
"[t]he State cannot demean [homosexuals'] existence or control their destiny
85. Id. at 2479.
86. Id. at 2480.
87. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992)).
88. ld. at 2481.
89. Id.
90. id. at 2481-82.
91. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
92. Id. at 2482.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2483.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2483 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)).
2003]
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by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government." 99
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Although Justice O'Connor agreed that the Texas statute was unconsti-
tutional, she based her decision on the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and did not join in overruling Bowers.' Justice
O'Connor noted that Texas' statute does not apply to individuals equally be-
cause only participants of the same-sex are harmed by the law. 10 1
Like the majority, Justice O'Connor discussed the practical conse-
quences that section 21.06 has for homosexuals, including restrictions on
employment choices and having to register as sex offenders."° She also
stated, 'Texas' sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby
making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as
everyone else."'' 3 Justice O'Connor indicated that morality, without any
other state interest, is not a rational basis for discriminating against a particu-
lar group." She distinguished Bowers, pointing out that there the Court only
addressed whether there was a right to engage in homosexual sodomy under
the Due Process Clause, not whether "moral disapproval of a group" is a ra-
tional basis to criminalize same-sex sodomy under the Equal Protection
Clause. 105
Justice O'Connor discredited Texas' argument that the statute only ap-
plies to homosexual conduct and not homosexuals personally, because the
conduct is so closely associated with being homosexual; it is impossible to
separate the conduct from the individual.'0 6 The law targets gay persons as
a class."'0 7 A state cannot punish only one class of citizens if it does not pun-
ish everyone, especially if the only rationale is moral disapproval.'0 8 How-
ever, Justice O'Connor was careful to note that other reasons may exist, such
as promotion of marriage, which would provide a rational basis for distin-
guishing between homosexuals and heterosexuals.'0 9
3. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia began his dissent by reiterating the ruling of Bowers, that
99. Id. at 2484.
100. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 2485.
102. Id. at 2485-86.
103. Id. at 2486.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2486-87.
107. Id. at 2487.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2487-88.
[Vol. 40
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homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right under the Due Process
Clause. ° He criticized the majority for stating instead that Lawrence and
Garner's conduct is "an exercise of their liberty."'' Then Justice Scalia at-
tacked the majority's application of the doctrine of stare decisis, arguing that
the majority should be consistent in applying the doctrine." 2 He claimed that
the Court in Casey argued that "intensely divisive controversy" was a reason
not to overrule Roe, but now in Lawrence, the Court is using the same argu-
ment as grounds to overrule Bowers."t3 However, Justice Scalia did agree
that Romer had cast the Bowers holding into doubt.' ' 4
Justice Scalia questioned the majority's assertion that there has been
"substantial and continuing" disapproval of the Bowers reasoning because,
in his view, the Court did not indicate precisely what criticisms they had
with the historical basis for Bowers."' His dissent declared that morality has
always driven the law and that if these laws are "invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy, indeed."'" 6
Next Justice Scalia attacked the majority's claim that there is a right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause.' He admitted that the Texas statute
did in fact restrict liberty, but claimed that the State is able to do this "as
long as due process is provided.""' In his view, no fundamental right was
implicated because fundamental rights are those that are "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition.""' 9 Therefore, the state statute must only
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
The dissent then turned to the contention that there was no rational basis
for the Texas law. Justice Scalia claimed that the reason for the statute was
to "further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are
'immoral and unacceptable."' 12 While this was considered a legitimate state
interest in Bowers, it was not accepted by the Lawrence majority. As a re-
sult, Justice Scalia believed the effect would be that morality can no longer
be used as a rationale for legislation.12'
Finally, Justice Scalia took on the Equal Protection claim, arguing that
the law only applied to conduct and not to the individual involved. 22 He fur-
ther claimed that even if the Texas statute did deny equal protection, it was
fully justified by "notions of sexual morality."' 23 Justice Scalia also criti-
110. Id. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2488-89.
113. Id. at 2488 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 866-67).
114. Id. at 2489.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2490 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
117. Id. at2491.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2491-92 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
120. Id. at 2495 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2496.
123. Id.
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cized the majority's use of an "unheard-of form of rational-basis review," 1
and Justice O'Connor's concurrence for its failure to explain what "a more
searching form of rational basis review" meant, and he asserted that the
cases she cited did not support her claim."z Despite Justice O'Connor's
claim that preserving marriage may still be a legitimate state interest, Scalia
believed her reasoning placed laws prohibiting same-sex marriage on "pretty
shaky grounds."'" His dissent concluded by labeling the majority's opinion
the "product of a Court... that has largely signed on to the so-called homo-
sexual agenda.' '1 27
Justice Thomas, who joined in Justice Scalia's dissent, wrote separately
to indicate that if he were a member of the Texas Legislature he would re-
peal the law.1 2' However, he believed that there was no general right to pri-
vacy in the Bill of Rights or any part of the Constitution and therefore
thought the statute should have been upheld. 129
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RATIONAL BASIS WITH
BITE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence indicated that a more
searching form of rational basis review has emerged in Equal Protection
cases. In several cases, the Supreme Court has applied a standard of review
that has become known as "rational basis with bite." 30 Under this standard,
the Court has found policies invalid that would be valid under the traditional
rational basis test.' 3 Finding these regulations "unconstitutional under ra-
tional basis review implies that the Court [is using] a more searching scru-
tiny."' 32 Customarily, courts apply only the most deferential standard of re-
view in an Equal Protection case where there is a challenge to legislation
that implicates neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right. How-
ever, courts may be moving away from this usual practice.'33
124. Id. at 2488.
125. Id. at 2496.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2498.
129. Id.
130. Victor Rosenblum of Northwestern University Law School has called this standard
of review "rational basis with teeth." Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Interme-
diate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779 n.ll (1987); Steven J. Eagle calls it
"meaningful scrutiny," stating: "The term 'meaningful scrutiny' is used here because it con-
veys my intent, because it is not a term of art in the Supreme Court's lexicon, and because the
existing terms of art are increasingly fuzzy." Eagle, supra note 43, at 1024.
131. Pettinga, supra note 130, at 779.
132. Id.
133. Id.; See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). There,
the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a federal food stamp program that
amended and redefined the term household from "related or non-related individuals" to only
related individuals. Id. at 529-30. Congress' objective in creating the Act was to "to safeguard
the health and well-being of the Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition among low-
[Vol. 40
12
California Western Law Review, Vol. 40 [2003], No. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol40/iss1/5
IMPLICATIONS OF LAWRENCE v. TEXAS
The rational basis test usually presumes legislation is constitutional;
thus, the court will uphold the law if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 134 It has been suggested that
the rational basis with bite standard is an effort to "reach perceived injustices
that otherwise lie beyond constitutional reach."' 35 Courts also use this test
"where classifications are apt to stigmatize or come close to trenching on
protected rights.' 36
It is difficult to tell from the language of Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence if she was using a traditional rational basis standard of review or the
rational basis with bite standard. In Lawrence, the result would have been
the same regardless of which standard was applied. However, a problem will
arise when courts try to apply this reasoning to future cases. In Lawrence,
O'Connor contended that "when a law exhibits such a desire to harm a po-
litically unpopular group, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] applied a more search-
ing form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal
Protection Clause."'37 In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized this statement,
claiming that Justice O'Connor did not explain exactly what this standard is,
and contended that the cases Justice O'Connor cited did not support this rea-
soning.'38 However, Justice O'Connor's assertion reiterates what scholars
have been contending for the past several years-that the Supreme Court has
been carving out a subsection under the traditional rational basis standard of
scrutiny to help unpopular groups that are subject to discrimination. 39
Justice O'Connor pointed out that traditional rational basis still applies
when dealing with economic or tax legislation because it is presumed that
these decisions will be worked out through the democratic process. 40 How-
income households." Id. at 533. The Court recognized that individuals' relation to one another
in a household are not rationally related to the proposed goal of the Act, which was to prevent
food stamp fraud. Id. Legislative history suggested that the real motive behind the amendment
was to prevent "hippies" from benefiting from the program. Id. at 534. In Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55 (1982), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Alaska law that pro-rated
benefits from state oil revenues among residents according to length of residency. Pettinga,
supra note 130, at 785 (citing Zobel, 457 U.S. at 56). The Court found that the statute violated
equal protection because it created "fixed, permanent distinctions between... classes of con-
cededly bona fide residents." Id. (citing Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59).
134. Pettinga, supra note 130, at 783 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230
(1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976)).
135. Id. at 780 (quoting Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, 71 A.B.A. J. 108,
112 (1985)).
136. Eagle, supra note 43, at 1025 (citing Richard A. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About
Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 316-17
(1993)).
137. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2485 (2003) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 2496.
139. See Eagle, supra note 43, at 1026 (the Court's review has been labeled as "covertly
heightened scrutiny") (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 769,
1612 (2d ed. 1988)); see also Pettinga, supra note 130, at 785; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose
Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REv. 297, 303 (1997).
140. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484-85.
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ever, in cases like Lawrence, where one's sexual orientation subjects one to
discrimination, courts must look deeper into the legislature's purpose for the
laws it enacts.
Justice O'Connor ended her concurrence by asserting that "[a] law
branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the State's moral
disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs con-
trary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under
any standard of review.""' This language implies that Justice O'Connor ap-
plied traditional rational basis review by her use of the phrase "any stan-
dard."142 However, she referred to gays and lesbians as "a class," which usu-
ally implies heightened scrutiny. 143 Then again, it seems that rational basis
with bite has been used when challenged legislation harms a class of indi-
viduals.'" Therefore, it is unclear whether this language refers to hyper-
rational review or to merely the rational basis standard.
At oral arguments, appellants requested rational basis review when
asked by Justice O'Connor if they sought heightened scrutiny of this law.1 45
Counsel for appellants also stated that Texas' only reason for the anti-
sodomy law was that it was "'a symbolic expression of disapproval.'- 1 46
Texas limited the statute to homosexual sodomy, showing that it did not to-
tally disapprove of sodomy; it only morally disapproved of sodomy when it
is conducted by same-sex partners.
Nonetheless, Texas contended that the Legislature did not purposefully
discriminate against persons engaging in homosexual conduct. 147 They ar-
gued that there was a rational basis for the statute because Texas had a "le-
gitimate state interest in legislatively expressing the long-standing moral tra-
ditions of the State against homosexual conduct, and in discouraging its
citizens-whether they be homosexual, bisexual or heterosexual-from
choosing to engage in what is still perceived to be immoral conduct."'4
However, if the State of Texas truly saw the conduct as immoral, then the
141. Id. at 2488 (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Scholars have suggested that courts should do away with the three-tiered structure
altogether because courts spend more time determining whether certain individuals are a sus-
pect class than they do looking closely at the purpose of the challenged legislation. See Todd
M. Hughes, Symposium, Towards a Radical and Plural Democracy: Making Romer Work, 33
CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 174-75 (1997). "[S]trict scrutiny is an artificial and outdated form of
judicial review, a part of the traditional liberal view of the law that, for the most part, no
longer serves any useful purpose and should be discarded." Id.
144. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (noting that "a bare [congressional] desire to harm a
politically unpopular group" is not a legitimate state interest) (citing United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cen-
ter, 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996)).
145. Graff, supra note I ("So Smith told O'Connor that nope, regular 'rational basis'
scrutiny-which means that the state can toss up any old justification for a law so long as it
has some rational relationship to its goal-is fine.").
146. Id.
147. Respondent's Brief at 26-27, Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001) (No. 02-102), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (Dec. 2, 2002).
148. Id.
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conduct would be illegal for heterosexuals as well as homosexuals. Texas
put forth that Section 21.06 rationally furthered its goal because it exempli-
fied the State's moral disapproval of sodomy between same-sex couples and
it created an incentive against such conduct.
1 49
Texas believed that rational basis analysis was consistent with Bowers,
even though the State acknowledged that Bowers "stands alone as the only
modem case in which this Court has approved moral tradition as a submitted
rational basis for legislation."15 0 However, applying the cases that have used
"rational basis with bite," "moral tradition" is not enough to justify the stat-
ute. It also appears that moral tradition will not even satisfy the toothless rule
of reason test without an additional legitimate state interest. 51 Notions of
morality alone do not justify legislation. It seems that Justice O'Connor's
concurrence may be saying that although the court has applied a more
searching scrutiny in other cases and it could have been used here, regular
rational basis review suffices because regulating morality is not a legitimate
state interest.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
A. Will Lawrence End Discrimination Against Gays and Lesbians?
Lawrence v. Texas has been called the "most important court decision
on the rights of gay and lesbian Americans in a generation." '52 This is not
because massive numbers of homosexuals have been arrested for sodomy,
but because they are assumed to be criminals without actually being charged
with or convicted of a crime.
Sodomy laws have sent a message that homosexuality is unacceptable.
"Perpetrators of violence against gay men and lesbians rationalize their vio-
lence as vigilante enforcement of sodomy laws."' 53 Homosexuals have also
been afraid to report anti-gay crimes committed against them because they
may be prosecuted under sodomy statutes.1 54 Lawrence changes this. Indi-
viduals can no longer justify their violent acts against gays and lesbians by
claiming that they are simply retaliating against criminals. There is also
more incentive for the victims of these crimes to come forward. Thus, legal
protection from hate crimes should now be more readily available to gays
and lesbians.
Legislators have used Bowers in order to exclude gays and lesbians
from legal protection, rationalizing that homosexuals are "immoral criminals
149. Graff, supra note 1.
150. Respondent's Brief at 27, Lawrence, (No. 02-102).
151. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487-88.
152. Sodomy Case Will Have Wide Impact, The Data Lounge, at http://www.datalounge.
com/datalounge/news.record/html?record=20628 (Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Impact Arti-
cle].
153. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced"
Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 124 (2000).
154. Id. at 125.
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deserving of punishment." '  This may have been true under Bowers-
homosexuals engaged in sodomy were breaking the law-but Lawrence held
that sodomy is no longer a crime. Therefore, if lawmakers try to exclude
gays and lesbians from legal protection, they will have to provide justifica-
tions other than their previous argument that homosexuals are criminals.
B. Are Laws Limiting Same-Sex Marriage Really on "Shaky Ground"?
Now that Lawrence has been decided, gays and lesbians are turning
their focus to the debate over same-sex marriage. The Bowers decision re-
mained one of the strongest obstacles to same-sex marriage because it justi-
fied state-sanctioned discrimination. 56 Conservatives feel that invalidation
of the Texas sodomy statute will change family status and undermine the
"favored treatment of male-female marriage by state lawmakers." 7 Justice
Breyer stated in oral arguments that Bowers did not understand the relation-
ship between sodomy and families.1 8 By this he means that homosexual
couples should not be defined in terms of what type of sex they have, in the
same way we do not define heterosexual couples and families in terms of
what type of sex they choose to have. Justice Kennedy emphasized this point
in Lawrence, explaining that asking whether there is a fundamental right to
homosexual sodomy is as demeaning as asking whether marriage is about
the right to engage in sexual intercourse.159
There are thousands of gay families in America today."W Although
Texas made same-sex sodomy illegal, it obviously felt that homosexuals
could form families because adoption by lesbians and gays is legal in the
state.161 It appears Justice Scalia may have provided the most persuasive jus-
tification for same-sex marriage. It has been argued that the Texas statute
prohibiting same-sex sodomy applies equally to men and women: men can
only violate the law with other men and women with other women and
therefore does not deny equal protection. 62 Although the statute only applies
to homosexual conduct, it does target homosexuals personally, because the
conduct is so closely associated with being homosexual. 63 This rationale
155. Id. at 126 (citing Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay
Men, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 209, 232 (1994)).
156. Comment, Developments in the Law: 11. Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths
Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV.
L. Rnv. 2004, 2006 (2003).
157. Impact Article, supra note 148 (this case could have "broad implications... for the
marriage laws in every state").
158. Graff, supra note 1.
159. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
160. Stephen Henderson, At High Court, Antigay Case Looks Weak, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, at http://www.philly.commld/inquirer/news/nation/5490151.htm (Mar. 27, 2003).
161. Graff, supra note 1. According to Justice Ginsberg, if the state thinks homosexuals
could be proper guardians of children, then "they should be free to have intimate relations."
Id.
162. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2486-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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applies to same-sex marriage-men cannot marry men and women cannot
marry women. Justice Scalia, however, noted that if this rationale does not
support homosexual sodomy laws, it will not protect state laws prohibiting
marriage with members of the same sex.
64
Scalia also contended that the Bowers rationale-that some forms of
sexual behavior are "immoral and unacceptable"' 6 5-has justified many laws
regulating sexual behavior relating to the identity of the partner,166 including
laws regulating marriage. 67 However, Lawrence specifically rejects the ra-
tionale that notions of morality justify legislation. Justice Scalia even stated
that this leaves state laws against same-sex marriage on "shaky grounds."' 168
Although Justice O'Connor believes there may be a legitimate state interest
in "preserving the traditional institution of marriage," Justice Scalia insists
this is "just a kinder way of describing the State's moral disapproval of
same-sex couples."' 69
The most persuasive argument for the legalization of same-sex marriage
comes at the end of Justice Scalia's dissent. Although the majority opinion
says that Lawrence does not address whether there should be formal recogni-
tion of homosexual relationships, 7' Justice Scalia warns us "not [to] believe
it.' 71 He believes that the majority's rationale regarding "personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education" applies to homosexual relationships.'72 Allowing
gays and lesbians to express themselves intimately in the same way hetero-
sexuals do leaves supporters of limitations on same-sex marriage with little
possible justification for "denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual
couples.' ' 173 Whether Scalia's dissent will come back to haunt him in gay
rights cases remains to be seen.
C. Will Gays in the Military Have to Continue to "Keep Their Mouths Shut"
About Their Sexuality?
Under the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy, members of the
armed forces "can be dismissed for engaging in homosexual acts, openly as-
serting that they are gay or lesbian or proclaiming a same-sex marriage.' 74
164. Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
166. Id. Scalia notes that the "identity" of a partner has been used to justify laws regard-
ing adultery, fornication, and adult incest. However, the "identity" of all of these participants
has nothing to do with the sex or gender of the participants. It is based specifically on who the
person is. Id.
167. Id. at 2495-96.
168. ld. at 2496.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2497-98.
171. Id. at 2498.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. George Ednionson, Lawsuit Challenges Military's Gay Policy, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
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One of the main justifications for the military's policy is moral disapproval
of homosexuals.175 This is an area where O'Connor's failure to clearly ar-
ticulate whether she was using a rational or a hyper-rational standard may
pose a problem.
Courts have often deferred to the military regarding internal discipline
and national security.'76 Courts usually give deference to legislation under
rational basis review, but as stated earlier, under rational basis with bite,
courts will look closer to see if the means of the legislation support the pur-
ported goal. "[W]hen judging the rationality of a regulation in the military
context, we owe even more special deference to the 'considered professional
judgment' of 'appropriate military officials."'177 If lower courts are unsure
how to apply the rational basis standard, they will most likely give deference
to the military's policy without looking closer to see if its policy meets its
alleged goals. The Supreme Court may decline to review cases on this issue
while the implications of the Lawrence decision work their way through the
lower courts.
Another obstacle standing in the way of overturning the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy is that the armed forces are governed by the Uniformed
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).' 78 Lawrence may not be legally binding on
the UCMJ's sodomy law because that law is based on Article 1, Section 8 of
the Constitution.179 The rationale supporting the military law is that members
of the armed forces are often in close living quarters with almost little or no
privacy. 80 Lawrence says that gays and lesbians have a right to liberty in
their private, consensual, intimate conduct. The military's policy claims only
to prevent homosexuals from openly claiming they are gay. The military will
argue that its rationale is based on more than simply the moral disapproval
that Lawrence prohibits.
D. After Lawrence, Do We Still Teach Students Reading, Writing and
Abstinence?
Although there is much hype over what impact Lawrence will have on
same-sex marriage and the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy, there are
other areas of importance that are not receiving as much attention. There are
CONSTrl.TION, at http://www.ajc.coinnewscontent/news/0703/20dontask.htmi (July 20,
2003).
175. Id.
176. Alfonso Madrid, Comment, Rational Basis Review Goes Back to the Dentist's
Chair: Can the Toothless Test of Heller v. Doe Keep Gays in the Military, 4 TEMP. POL. &
Cry. RTs. L. REv. 167, 181 (1994); see also Edmonson, supra note 170.
177. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 509 (1986)).
178. Lawrence Decision Launches Military "Gay" Ban Challenges, Concerned Women
for America, available at http://www.cultureand family.orglarticledisplay.asp?ed=4275& de-
partment=CFI&categoryid=cfreport (July 16, 2003).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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still many statutes on the books that bias gays and lesbians that will not be
removed immediately. 8 ' Education is one area in which this is a particular
problem.'82 "Even though Lawrence declares homosexuals should have the
same respect and rights as heterosexuals, don't expect school districts to
change [their] curriculum."'8 3
Many states have statutes that require schools to teach abstinence from
sex until marriage." Oklahoma law presently requires teachers to instruct
public school students that "engaging in homosexual activity, promiscuous
sexual activity, intravenous drug use, or contact with contaminated blood
products is primarily responsible for HIV infection" and that "avoiding these
activities is the only method of preventing the spread of the virus." '185 Sev-
eral California statutes stress abstinence and require course material to dis-
cuss the emotional and psychological consequences of intercourse outside of
marriage. 8 6 Statutes also mandate that "honor and respect for monogamous
heterosexual marriage" be taught. 8 7 Course material should be "free of ra-
cial, ethnic and gender biases;" however, these statutes do not state that the
law should be free from bias against homosexuals.' 88
The rationale behind these education laws does not apply to gay and
lesbian students because same-sex marriages are not legal.'89 Gay and les-
bian students are given the impression that they do not "count and that they
must remain sexually abstinent for life.""9 If schools want to make gay and
lesbian students feel that they are not wrong because of their orientation,
these statutes need to be changed. Otherwise, homosexual teenagers will
continue to feel like outsiders, or even criminals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas has been extremely
meaningful for gay and lesbian individuals everywhere. This was exempli-
fied here in San Diego and at other Gay Pride parades around the nation,
where people joyously waved banners and displayed signs with the names of
Lawrence and Garner written on them.
181. Robert DeKoven, State Laws Require States to Ignore GLBTs, GAY & LESBIAN
TIMEs, Aug. 21, 2003, at 35 (discussing how Lawrence should apply to state laws that require
schools to teach that gay relations are illegal).
182. This section is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis on the presence of biased
laws in education. It is simply noting that these laws still exist and will continue to affect gay
and lesbian students.
183. DeKoven, supra note 177.
184. See Mary E. Clark, AIDS Prevention: Legislative Options, 16 AM. J. L. AND MED.
107,116 (1990).
185. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
186. CAL. ED. CODE § 51553 (2003); CAL. ED. CODE § 51229 (2003).
187. CAL. ED. CODE § 51553 (2003) (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. DeKoven, supra note 177.
190. Id
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Views on homosexuality have evolved since Bowers was decided, 9'
even though the state of Texas has claimed otherwise.'92 The Supreme Court
no longer recognizes morality alone as justification for laws, especially
when the only objective is to discriminate against a specific group of indi-
viduals. Simply not liking someone because of what he or she does in his or
her own bedroom cannot be used as a reason to deny individuals equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Lawrence has a direct impact on states that have sodomy laws. The de-
cision will provide strong precedent for an argument defending same-sex
marriage and possibly serve as an additional rationale to strike down the
military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. Although Lawrence is a great tri-
umph for the gay rights movement, statutes will continue to exist that serve
to discriminate against homosexuals, especially in education. The struggle
for equality for gays and lesbians will continue. However, Lawrence stands
for the proposition that "unequal law and its broad harms are intolerable in
this country."' 93
TracyLee Schimelfenig"
191. Graff, supra note 1 (The decision was decided "17 years ago, and there has been a
cultural revolution since then, a transformation of American attitudes toward lesbians and gay
men."); Henderson, supra note 156 (Smith, counsel for respondent, "could not clarify... how
the law fit with evolving cultural views on homosexuality").
192. Respondents' Brief at 27, Bowers (No. 02-102) ("Nothing has changed in the six-
teen years since Bowers to justify abandonment of its conclusion").
193. Petitioners' Brief at 34, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
J.D. Candidate, June 2004, California Western School of Law; B.A., Marywood Univer-
sity, 1999, magna cum laude.
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